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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ] 
STEPHEN PINO, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 940370-CA 
) Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals by 
provision of U.GA. §78-2a-3(2)(f). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented by this appeal. 
1. Is the trial court's conclusion of law that exigent circumstances justified the 
warrantless drawing of blood without Defendant's consent supported by factual findings of 
said exigent circumstances? The standard of review of the trial court's Findings of Fact is 
the "clearly erroneous" standard. The trial court's Conclusions of Law are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Hodson, 886 P.2d 556 (Ut. App. 1993)(citing State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 
1217, (Ut. App. 1993). 
2. Was the drawing of Defendant's blood without his consent and without a 
search warrant a violation of Defendant's rights against unreasonable searches and seizures? 
The standard of review is the "clearly erroneous" standard of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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52(a). State v. Sterger. 808 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1991)(citing State v. Hargraves, 806 P.2d 
228 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the following authorities are set out in the Addendum: 
1. Amendment IV, United States Constitution. 
2. Section 14, Article I, Constitution of the State of Utah. 
3. Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated. 
4. Section 76-5-207, Utah Code Annotated. 
5. Section 77-23-204(2-3), Utah Code Annotated. 
6. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in a criminal information with Count I, Automobile 
Homicide, a Second Degree Felony; Count II, Kidnapping, a Second Degree Felony; and 
Count III, Leaving the Scene of an Accident, a Class A Misdemeanor. Said information 
charged that on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, Appellant was operating a motor 
vehicle with a blood content of .08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of 
alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and caused 
the death of another by operating the vehicle in a criminally negligent manner, in violation 
of Section 76-5-207(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated. Count II alleged that on or about 
November 30, 1993, Defendant did intentionally or knowingly and without authority of law 
and against the will of the victim, detained or restrained another for a substantial period, or 
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did hnlil another in involuntary servitude, in violation of Section,. 7(>VU)1, Utah (Vide 
Annotated. Count III alleged that I VliMidant, «n\ < u <>l u uji the 30th day of November, 1993, 
did tip'i »'* r7nT!:im a t the scene of an accident, resulting in injury to a person, in violation of 
Sectioi 5 6-29, Utah Code Annotated (R UOHHL1 i 
y ± J, 1994, a hearing was held on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Defendant sought to suppress the introduction of evideru )lood alcohol 
test alleged in IIIIM1 d' , »« 10% On February *,, _ . ., • ^ ouri entered its 
Memorandum Decision, overruling and denying Defendant's Motion in Suppress I R di9-
045). 
Defendant entered into a plea agreement under the terms of which Del'endunt 
entered a conditional plea to'"the charge ol Automobile I (onuntie, a Second Degree Felony, 
as charged i the Information. Said plea was entered pursuant to Rule ll(i) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, upon the condition thai I )elen<ianl preserved llie fight 
to appeal the trial ronrf.s denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress and reserving the right 
to withdraw the plea of guilty in the event of a successful appeal. Pursuani lo i lie terms of 
the plea agreement, Count 11, kidnapping, a Second Degree Felony, and Count III, Leaving 
the Scene of an Accident, a Class A Misdemeanor were dismissed (R 083-089). 
On June 7, 1994, the Court enteieil iiis Jtitlfjnni destitution Judgment, 
Soifetire, ant! Slav ol '.Execution of Sentence, sentencing Defendant to a term, of one to 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, .and staying the execution ml iLif NCNII'IKV pending 
this appeal I IK < omul in.iied a Certificate of Probable Cause and the Defendant was 
released on $50,000.00 bond, pending the appeal (R 240-242). 
M, I99.\ :d that the Defendant drove a motor 
vehicle in Pueblo, Colorado, in \-_. ;- : -* ' - ; ' \ order that, as a condition of 
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Defendant's release on bail pending appeal, Defendant was not to drive a motor vehicle. 
The Court lifted its previous stay of execution of sentence and committed the Defendant to 
the custody of the Division of Corrections to serve the sentence previously ordered. 
B. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 30,1993, Defendant was driving a vehicle (R 157) southbound 
on Interstate 15 in Washington County, Utah. Four other individuals were in Defendant's 
vehicle (R 164). Defendant's vehicle collided with another southbound vehicle driven by 
Melvin Cropper (R 156). As a result of the collision, the Cropper vehicle left the highway 
(R 160) and in the ensuing wreck, both Melvin Cropper and the passenger in the Cropper 
vehicle, Melvin Cropper's wife, Carol Cropper, were seriously injured. Carol Cropper 
subsequently died as a result of her injuries (R 156). 
At the scene of the accident, Defendant got into another vehicle and 
demanded that the driver of the vehicle take him to the police. As the vehicle approached 
St. George, it stopped at a traffic light (R 119-126). At that traffic light, the male and 
female occupants of the vehicle got out and approached the patrol car of St. George Police 
Officer Tom Fjermestead (R 136-37). Defendant also got out of the vehicle and got into 
officer Fjermestead's patrol car (R 138). 
After taking Defendant into custody, Officer Fjermestead received a radio 
transmission from Utah Highway Patrol Lt. Bob Flowers, requesting that the Defendant be 
transported to the Dixie Regional Medical Center for the purpose of drawing his blood (R 
140). Upon arrival at the Dixie Regional Medical Center, Officer Fjermestead relinquished 
custody of the Defendant to Sgt. Jim Lloyd (R 141). 
Sgt. Lloyd, smelled the odor of alcohol and^believed that Defendant had been 
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involved in an alcohol-related accident (R 300). Trooper Lloyd placed ihe Defendant under 
arrest and reviewed the r questionnaire with the Defendant in 
prepai mum for testing Defendant's blood (R 307). The form read to Defendani by Sgt. 
Lloyd, states in pertinent part: "An nn; ;^  =ui m youi breath or blood in 
violate -6-^t.t ui uiv, wiaii Code may, or the presence of alcohol and/or 
drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a motor result in the 
denial or suspension of your driving privilege.or refusal to issue you a license" (R 307). Sgt. 
Lloyd then asked the Defendant: "What is your response to my requesi iliai vim suhiim 10 
a chemical test?" Defendant responded, "I don « u:int to" (R 308). 
m &pite of the Defendant's refusal to consent to a blood-alcohol U'Si, Sgi. 
Lloyd instructed a nurse to draw Defendzml','; blood (l< 113-344). At the suppression 
hearing, iated, and the court made a finding, that Defendant's blood was 
drawn without his consent (R 326). 
E -wxi uvcr an hour minutes after his arrival at the 
hospital (R 328). During that time period, neither Sgt. I Joyd nor an\ • ithei police officer 
attempted to contact the counly attorney's office or a judge or magistrate to get a search 
war i .nil (R 329-30). It was approximately 30 minutes between the time Defendant refused 
to consent to the drawing of his blood anti when his blood was drawn (R 330). 
When Defendant stated he did not want his blood drawn, Sgt. Lloyd informed 
him that because he had been involved in an accideiu .nm iiii.i it wus I lelieved someone was 
going to die oi IK id died as n resull of the accident, Defendant's blood would be drawn, even 
if he refused (R 334). Sgt. Lloyd believed he was authorized to <\\:\v DeleiKbnfs hlood, 
over his refusal, pursuant to Section 7<>-*i )\ ^jocie Annotated. At that time, Sgt. 
ot know that that statute had been amended (335). 
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Defendant was subsequently booked into the Washington County Jail and 
charged as indicated above. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant was transported to the Dixie Regional Medical Center for the 
purpose of drawing his blood. Defendant's blood was drawn without his consent after being 
told that his blood would be drawn, whether or not he refused. Defendant's blood was 
drawn under the direction of Sgt. Jim Lloyd, believing he was authorized by statute to do 
so without Defendant's consent. If Defendant was arrested under the DUI statute and Sgt. 
Lloyd had reason to believe a victim of Defendant's conduct may die. In fact, Sgt. Lloyd had 
no statutory authority to draw Defendant's blood without his consent. 
Defendant's Blood was drawn without the benefit of a search warrant. In fact, 
no efforts whatsoever were made to obtain a search warrant. There are no exceptions to 
the requirement for obtaining a search warrant which justify the drawing of Defendant's 
blood without a search warrant. The trial court concluded that exigent circumstances 
justified the warrantless drawing of Defendant's blood. However, there are no factual 
findings to support such a conclusion. The reason there are no factual findings to support 
such a conclusion is that there are no facts to support such a finding. 
The erred in ruling that the warrantless drawing of Defendant's blood was 
justified by exigent circumstances. Defendant's blood was drawn in violation of his rights 
against unreasonable search and seizure and any evidence obtained as a result of that illegal 




THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY FACTUAL FINDINGS. 
In its Memorandum Decision denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress dated 
February 17,1994, the trial court set forth its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The 
court stated that it was relying on Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 16 L.Ed2 908, 86 
S.Ct. 1826, (1966), as well as two Utah cases, In the Interest of I.R.L., 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah 
App. 1987), and State v. Hodson, 866 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1993). Relying on those cases, 
the court concluded that Officer Fjermestead had probable cause to believe that Defendant 
drove a vehicle while having an unlawfully excessive amount of alcohol in his blood. The 
court further concluded that Defendant was arrested by Officer Fjermestead upon that 
probable cause. The court then concluded that the observations of Officer Fjermestead and 
Sgt. Lloyd, coupled with the accident and flight from the scene of the accident gave "clear 
indication that alcohol would be found through a blood test." The court then concluded that 
"exigent circumstances were present justifying a warrantless drawing of blood because of the 
dissipation of the evidence (the alcohol) in the bloodstream." Finally, the court concluded 
that the means of drawing the blood sample were reasonable. 
The court's conclusion that the warrantless drawing of defendant's blood was 
justified by exigent circumstances is not supported by any factual finding of exigency. The 
court found that Defendant's blood was drawn without his consent. The court found that 
the Defendant was informed that his blood would be drawn over his objection. And further, 
the court found that at no time did Sgt. Lloyd, Officer Fjermestead, or any other officer try 
to contact a magistrate in order to procure a search warrant to authorize the drawing of 
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Defendant's blood. There are absolutely no findings of fact to show that there was a need 
to draw the Defendant's blood without a search warrant due to the possibility of dissipation 
of the alcohol in Defendant's bloodstream, or any other exigent circumstance. 
"In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon. . . ." 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a). The same rule applies in criminal cases. State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988). The court 
in this case failed to support its conclusion of law that exigency justified the warrantless 
drawing of defendant's blood with any findings of facts indicating such exigency. The court 
made no findings of exigency because there were no facts to support such a finding. 
POINT II 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT 
AS OBTAINED FROM THE WARRANTLESS DRAWING OF 
DEFENDANT'S BLOOD WITHOUT HIS CONSENT IS 
INADMISSIBLE AND MUST BE EXCLUDED. 
A. 
THE STATE CANNOT RELY UPON THE IMPLIED CONSENT 
STATUTE TO JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS DRAWING OF 
DEFENDANT'S BLOOD. 
Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated creates a legal fiction that any 
person operating a motor vehicle within this state is considered to have given his consent to 
a chemical test or tests of his bodily fluids for the purpose of determining whether he is 
operating a motor vehicle with an unlawful blood alcohol content. Subsection 2(a) sets forth 
the penalties if the suspect refuses to submit to the requested tests. The suspect is warned 
that if he does not voluntarily submit to the chemical tests requested it may result in a 
revocation of the suspect's license to operate a motor vehicle. Subsection 8 states that if a 
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person refuses to submit to a chemical test, evidence of that refusal is admissible in any civil 
or criminal action arising out of the acts alleged to have been committed while the person 
was operating a motor vehicle under the influence. No other penalties are authorized under 
Section 41-6-44.10. 
Subsection 3 does authorize chemical tests to be administered if the suspect 
is dead, unconscious or in any other condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit 
to the tests, and the test or tests are so authorized, whether or not the suspect has been 
arrested. Subsection 7 states that a person to be tested does not have the right to consult 
an attorney, or have an attorney present as a condition for taking the test. 
At the suppression hearing, Sgt. Lloyd testified that he informed the 
Defendant he was authorized to draw the Defendant's blood, even if the Defendant refused. 
Sgt. Lloyd testified that he made that statement believing he was authorized to do so under 
Section 76-5-207, Utah Code Annotated. Sgt. Lloyd further testified that he was unaware 
that Section 76-5-207 had been amended (R 334-35). 
1993 Senate Bill No. 85 amended the DUI and Automobile statutes. Section 
41-6-44.5(i)(b) was added to the DUI statute. It reads as follows: 
In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6-44.10 does 
not render the results of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence of a 
defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is 
admissible except when prohibited by the Rules of Evidence or the 
Constitution. 
Similar language was added to the automobile homicide statute. The 
Legislature has included Constitutional safeguards to the admissibility and blood alcohol 
results. 
One of the two Utah cases cited by the trial court in its Memorandum 
Decision, In the Interest of I.R.L., supra, as well as other Utah cases addressing the issue 
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of the admissibility of blood alcohol results, predate the 1993 amendment to the DUI and 
Automobile Homicide statutes. See In the Interest of IR.L., supra; State v. Sterger, 808 
P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Cruise, 446 P.2d 307 (Utah 1968). They based their 
rulings on whether or not the defendant was under arrest at the time of the administration 
of the test, and if not under arrest, whether or not actual consent to the test was given. That 
analysis has some applicability here, however, the amendments to the DUI and Automobile 
Homicide statutes raise the analysis to a new level. 
The other Utah case cited by the trial court in its Memorandum Decision was 
State v. Hodson, supra. It correctly applies the three-prong test set forth in Schmerber, 
supra. Schmerber gives us the Constitutional safeguards that the amended DUI and 
Automobile Homicide statutes now require. 
Prior to its amendment, effective May 3, 1993, the Automobile Homicide 
statute, Section 76-5-207(6), permitted the admissibility of a chemical test administered on 
a defendant, either with or without his consent, if he had been arrested under the 
Automobile Homicide statute or the DUI statute, Section 41-6-44, and f!when the officer has 
reason to believe that the victim may die." [Emphasis added.] Section 7(a) required "After 
a defendant is placed under arrest for a violation of this section, the peace officer shall 
require that the defendant submit to a chemical test of his blood or urine. This test may be 
required without the consent of the defendant as provided in Subsection 6(b)." 
Since its amendment in 1993, the Automobile Homicide statute is less broad 
and certainly more restrictive with respect to the suspect's rights. It is quoted in its entirety 
in the Addendum. Section 76-5-702(6) now makes admissible evidence of the defendant's 
blood or breath alcohol content or drug content unless prohibited by the Rules of Evidence 
or the Constitution. All of the language regarding the administration of the chemical test 
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without the Defendant's consent has been eliminated. Evidence of a defendant's blood 
alcohol content as determined by the administration of chemical tests must now pass muster 
under the Rules of Evidence and the Constitution. 
B. 
THE DRAWING OF DEFENDANT'S BLOOD WITHOUT A 
SEARCH WARRANT WAS AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE AND ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED THEREBY 
SHOULD BE EXCLUDED. 
Because this was a warrantless search and seizure, the State has the burden 
of proving that the search was lawful. State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 
1990). cert denied 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). Schmerber, tells us what requirements must 
be met in order for the state to meet this burden. In Schmerber, the U.S. Supreme Court 
established three elements: (1) A clear indication that evidence would be found; (2) exigent 
circumstances that justified the warrantless bodily intrusion; and (3) that the method chosen 
was a reasonable one, performed in a reasonable manner. Id. at 768-72. The trial court in 
this case cited Hodson. The Hodson opinion draws heavily upon Schmerber and gives an 
excellent analysis of the three requirements for a warrantless search stated in Schmerber. 
Apparently, the court in this case cites Hodson in support of its conclusion that 
the drawing of Defendant's blood was done in a reasonable manner. Hodson is somewhat 
distinguishable since it deals with a fact situation wherein the Defendant stuffed his mouth 
with eight chips of black tar heroin. The court in Hodson ruled that the officers' had 
probable cause to believe that the Defendant had the controlled substance in his mouth. 
The court also found that the officers actions in putting their hands around the defendant's 
throat to keep him from swallowing the controlled substance were reasonable, however the 
case was remanded for factual findings to determine whether the officers actions in getting 
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the defendant to spit the heroin out of his mouth was reasonable. What the court in this 
case apparently ignored in its assessment of Hodson was the second of the three criteria, 
exigent circumstances. The Hodson court held that: 
[T]he state must establish exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless 
search by showing 'either that the procurement would have jeopardized 
the safety of the police officers or the public, or that the evidence was 
likely to have been lost or destroyed.' State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 
1252 (Utah App. 1990). Hodson at 561. 
It is certainly true that the concentration of alcohol in one's bloodstream can 
dissipate over time. However, there is no evidence as to the rate of dissipation, the inability 
by the officers to obtain a search warrant, or any other facts supporting the court's 
conclusion of exigency. 
Sgt. Lloyd testified that he was at the hospital with the Defendant for 
approximately 20 minutes before even asking the Defendant to submit to a blood test. It 
then took another 30 to 40 minutes to find a nurse to administer the test. There is no 
evidence that at any time during that interview Sgt. Lloyd or any other officer felt they were 
operating under a time constraint or made any attempt to obtain the authorization from a 
disinterested magistrate to conduct a search. Sgt. Lloyd was very clear in his testimony at 
the suppression hearing that he went ahead and conducted the search, i.e. ordered the 
drawing of Defendant's blood, over Defendant's refusal, because he felt he was authorized 
by statute to do so. 
The Schmerber case involved the drawing of the defendant's blood while at 
a hospital receiving treatment for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The blood 
was drawn at the direction of a police officer, without a search warrant, despite the 
defendant's refusal to consent to the blood test. Although the court held that under the 
facts of the case the defendant's constitutional rights had not been violated by the 
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compulsory blood test and the admission of the evidence, the case gives us the rule of law 
to be applied in such cases, as clearly explained and followed by this court in Hodson. The 
Schmerber court gives us insight into the importance of this issue. 
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth 
Amendment protects forbade any such intrusions on the mere chance 
that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear 
indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental 
human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such 
evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search. 
Although the facts which established probable cause to arrest in this 
case also suggested the required relevance and likely success of a test 
of petitioner's blood for alcohol, the question remains whether the 
arresting officer was permitted to draw these inferences himself, or was 
required instead to procure a warrant before proceeding with the test. 
Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and, 
absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into 
the human body are concerned. The requirement that a warrant be 
obtained is a requirement that the inferences to support the search lfbe 
drawn by neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by 
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime". Johnson v. United States, 33 U.S. 10, 13-14, 92 L.Ed. 436 440, 
68 S.Ct. 367; See also, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11, 12 L.Ed. 
2d 723, 725, 726, 84 S.Ct. 1509. The importance of informed, detached 
and deliberate determinations of the issue, whether or not to invade 
another's body in search of evidence of guilty is indisputable and great. 
The officer in the present case, however, might reasonably have 
believed that the he was confronted with an emergency in which the 
delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, 
threatened "the destruction of the evidence." Preston v. United States, 
376 U.S. 364, 367, 11 L.Ed.2d 777, 780, 84 S.Ct. 881. We are told that 
the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after 
drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system. 
Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring 
the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, 
there was not time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. 
Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt to secure 
evidence of blood alcohol content in this case was an appropriate 
incident to petitioner's arrest. 
Id. at 919-920. 
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With the information available to Sgt. Lloyd, he certainly could have requested 
that Defendant consent to a chemical test of his blood immediately upon Defendant's arrival 
at the hospital. He did not do so. If, in fact, exigent circumstances existed at the time 
Defendant's blood was drawn, it was at least in some part due to the lack of action on the 
part of Sgt. Uoyd. Certainly, within the time interval between when Defendant arrived at 
the hospital and Defendant's blood was drawn, any of three District Court Judges or one 
Court Commissioner in the Fifth District could have been contacted and a search warrant 
sought upon oral testimony as provided for in Section 77-23-204, Utah Code Annotated. 
There is not evidence as to whether or not such an attempt would have been successful 
because there is no evidence that such an attempt was made. 
It cannot be argued that the state has an interest in this in determining 
whether or not Defendant's blood alcohol level was above the statutory limit. However, the 
state's interests do not outweigh the Defendant's rights against an unlawful intrusion into his 
body. Defendant does not take the position that under no circumstances was Sgt. Lloyd 
justified in requiring Defendant to submit to a chemical test of his blood. If exigent 
circumstances are present, no warrant is required. If exigent circumstances are not present, 
a warrant is required. The State's interest must be weighed against Defendant's rights. The 
Fourth Amendment insures that. In this case, Sgt. Lloyd certainly had time to seek out a 
search warrant either through normal means or telephonically. At the very least, the state 
has failed to prove that he could not. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests that this court 
reverse the trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress and remand the case to the trial 
14 
court with an order excluding the blood alcohol evidence obtained from the warrantless 
search. 
Respectfully submitted this '30__ day of June, 1995. 
JA 
Douglas D. Terry 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this ^0 day of June, 1995,1 did personally mail 
four true and correct copies of the above and foregoing document to: 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Bldg 
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AMENDMENT IV, United State Constitution 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
Section 14, Article I, Constitution of the State of Utah 
[Unreasonable Searches Forbidden « Issuance of Warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
e searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated. 
Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug — Number of tests - Refusal -
Warning, report — Hearing, revocation of license — Appeal - Person incapable of refusal -
Results of test available — Who may give test - Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have given 
his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of 
determining whether he was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-
6-44.4, while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any 
drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance or 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, 
if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer having grounds to 
believe that person to have been operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 
or 41-6-44.4, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol 
and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled substance 
or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered 
and how many of them are administered. 
(ii) If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to 
take one or more requested tests, even though he does submit to any other requested 
test or tests, is a refusal under this section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to 
a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test or tests 
to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific 
chemical test is not a defense to taking a test requested by a peace officer, and it is 
not a defense in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding resulting from a 
person's refusal to submit to the requested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested by a 
peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection (1), and 
refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the person shall be warned by the peace 
officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in 
revocation of the person's license to operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (a), if the person does not 
immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be 
administered a peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver License 
Division, immediate notice of the Driver License Division's intention to revoke the person's 
privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate 
notice on behalf of the Driver License Division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and 
(hi) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver License 
Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the Driver 
License Division. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form by the 
Driver License Division, serve also as the temporary license. 
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed report, within five days after the 
date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been operating 
or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, while under the influence 
of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while 
having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the 
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and that the person had refused to submit 
to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's 
intention to revoke his license under this section is entitled to a hearing. 
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten days 
after the date of the arrest. 
(iii) Upon written request, the division shall grant to the person an 
opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing 
before the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the state is revoked 
beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest for a period of: 
(A) one year unless Subsection (B) applies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous license sanction 
after July 1,1993, under this section, Section 41-6-44.4, 41-6-44.6, or 53-3-223, 
or a conviction after July 1, 1993, under Section 41-6.44. 
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the Driver 
License Division, the hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a 
person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44, 41-6-44.4, or 44-
6-44.6; and 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test. 
(g) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of relevant books and papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace 
officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the 
transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in Section 21-5-4. 
(h) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the person 
was requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, 
or if the person fails to appear before the Driver License Division as required in the notice, 
the Driver License Division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in 
Utah beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of: 
(i) (A) one year unless Subsection (B) applies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous license sanction 
after July 1,1993, under this section, Section 53-3-223, 41-6-44.4, or 41-6-44.6, 
or a conviction after July 1, 1993, under Section 41-6-44. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, in 
addition to any fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(14), a fee under Section 53-3-
105, which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover 
administrative costs. 
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed 
court decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that the 
revocation was improper. 
(i) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License 
Division under this section may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial. 
Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person resides. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering him 
incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have 
withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the test or tests may be 
administered whether the person has been arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who is tested, the results of the test or tests shall 
be made available to him. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized 
under Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to 
determine the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation does not apply to taking a urine or 
breath specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under 
Section 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from any 
person whom a peace officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or 
hospital or medical facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or 
criminal liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered according to 
standard medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of his 
own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests administered at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or 
preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at 
the direction of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or tests, the 
person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or have an attorney, 
physician, or other person present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or any 
additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in any civil or criminal 
action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person 
was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, combination of alcohol and any drug, or while having any measurable 
controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
Section 76-5-207, Utah Code Annotated. 
Automobile Homicide 
(1) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if the 
actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of .08% or 
greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that renders the actor incapable of 
safely operating the vehicle, and causes the death of another by operating the vehicle 
in a negligent manner. 
(b) For purposes of this subsection, "negligent" means simple negligence, the 
failure to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent person exercise 
under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if the 
actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of .08% or 
greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that renders the actor incapable of 
safely operating the vehicle, and causes the death of another by operating the motor 
vehicle in a criminally negligent manner. 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "criminally negligent" means criminal 
negligence as defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4). 
(3) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section 41.6-44.3 and 
the provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6-44.5 
apply to determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this section. 
(4) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood is based upon grams of alcohol per one 
hundred cubic centimeters of blood. 
(5) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is on or has been legally 
entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense to any charge of violating this section. 
(6) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is 
admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
(7) For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle" means any self-propelled vehicle and 
includes any automobile, truck van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft. 
(c) 1953-1993 By the Michie Company 
Section 77-23-204, Utah Code Annotated. 
[Examination of complainant and witnesses — Witness not in physical presence of magistrate 
— Duplicate original warrants — Return.] 
(2) When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in the absence of an affidavit, a 
search warrant may be issued upon sworn oral testimony of a person who is not in the 
physical presence of the magistrate, provided the magistrate is satisfied that probable cause 
exists for the issuance of the warrant. The sworn oral testimony may be communicated to 
the magistrate by telephone or other appropriate means and shall be recorded and 
transcribed. After transcription, the statement shall be certified by the magistrate and filed 
with the court. This statement shall be deemed to be an affidavit for purposes of this 
section. 
(a) The grounds for issuance and contents of the warrant issued pursuant to 
Subsection (2) shall be those required by this chapter. Prior to issuance of the 
warrant, the magistrate shall require the law enforcement officer or the prosecuting 
attorney who is requesting the warrant to read to him verbatim the contents of the 
warrant. The magistrate may direct that specific modifications be made in the 
warrant. Upon approval, the magistrate shall direct the law enforcement officer or 
the prosecuting attorney for the government who is requesting the warrant to sign the 
magistrate's name on the warrant. This warrant shall be called a duplicate original 
warrant and shall be deemed a warrant for purposes of this chapter. In these cases 
the magistrate shall cause to be made an original warrant. The magistrate shall enter 
the exact time of issuance of the duplicate original warrant on the face of the original 
warrant. 
(b) Return of a duplicate original warrant and the original warrant shall be in 
conformity with this chapter. Upon return, the magistrate shall require the person 
who gave the sworn oral testimony establishing the grounds for issuance of the 
warrant to sign a copy of the transcript. 
(3) If probable cause is shown, the magistrate shall issue a search warrant. 
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
[Findings by the court.] 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5SA; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes 
of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent 
that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open 
court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, 
issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under 
Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is used on more than one ground. 
